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In this article I study a dynamic stochastic extension of the “differential rents” model of 
Sattinger (1979) that generates endogenous mismatch in equilibrium. I depart from the 
standard assignment literature in assuming that agents’ characteristics may change over 
time and that re-matching is feasible but costly. I show that, when agent characteristics are 
stochastic, rigidities that prevent partners from re-matching may change the matching 
outcome, even if the level of output continues to satisfy monotone differences in type. I 
construct and prove the existence of an equilibrium characterized by (i) a positive 





En este artículo se estudia una extensión dinámica estocástica del modelo de “rentas 
diferenciales” de Sattinger (1979) que genera desajustes en la forma de “emparejamiento” 
en equilibrio. El modelo se aparta de los modelos estándares de asignación de tipos en dos 
dimensiones: se permite que las características de los agentes cambien en el tiempo y se 
permite cambiar de parejas, aunque a cierto costo.  Se muestra que, bajo estos dos 
supuestos, las rigideces que dificultan que los agentes cambien de pareja pueden cambiar el 
resultado del emparejamiento, incluso si el nivel de producto satisface diferencias 
monótonas en los tipos. Se construye y prueba la existencia de un equilibrio donde el 
emparejamiento es positivamente seleccionado entre los agentes que quieren cambiar de 











                                                 
I wish to thank Hugo Hopenhayn for his invaluable advice and guidance. I also thank Lee Ohanian, Pierre-Olivier Weill, 
Christian Hellwig and Roberto Fattal-Jaef for many helpful suggestions and insights. 
Address: Banco Central de Chile, Agustinas 1180, Santiago, Chile; email: anaudon@bcentral.cl 1 Introduction
This article study a dynamic matching problem that generates endogenous mismatch in
equilibrium. The model is a dynamic stochastic extension of the ”diﬀerential rents” model
of Sattinger (1979) where a continuum of two types of heterogeneous agents can produce only
in pairs using a supermodular production function. I depart from the standard assignment
literature in assuming that agents’ characteristics may change over time. In the model re-
matching is feasible but costly. The last element is important, since letting characteristics
change over time with no cost of re-matching (i) would keep positive assortative matching
(no mismatch in equilibrium) and (ii) would imply that agents change partners whenever
a change in characteristics occurs regardless the size of the change, two features that seem
unrealistic. I show that, when agent characteristics are stochastic, rigidities that prevent
partners from re-matching may change the matching outcome, even if the level of output
continues to satisfy monotone diﬀerences in type.
As in any typical assignment model, here both the assignment and the rewards functions
are obtained simultaneously as the outcome of the interaction of two populations seeking
partners in a competitive market. An important diﬀerence between this model and the
standard static one is that, due to the cost of re-matching, not all agents are looking for
partners. This implies that the distribution of characteristics across agents in the market is,
in general, diﬀerent from the (known) distribution of those characteristics across the whole
population. This feature complicates the solution of the problem, since the assignment
function can not be obtained in advance, as is common in typical models of this type.
I construct and prove the existence of an equilibrium characterized by (i) a positive
assortative matching between agents that decide to re-match and (ii) bands of inaction for
existing matches. In particular, for every type of agents there is set of partner characteristics
that are acceptable in equilibrium, in the sense that they are not willing to pay the cost to
re-match in order to match the ”ideal” partner. I also provide an algorithm to compute the
matching function and the inaction sets.
To the best of my knowledge, this is one of the ﬁrst papers that tries to address assignment
problems with time-varying random characteristics. One exception is Anderson and Smith
(2008) that considers a model where agents gradually learn their types and show that pos-
itive assortative matching is, in most of the cases, not an equilibrium outcome even if the
production function is supermodular. A similar idea appears in Papageorgiou (2007). This
paper considers a search equilibrium market model where workers diﬀer on their types (that
remain unchanged throughout the course of their life). In particular, this paper considers a
two types - two occupations model where diﬀerent types have diﬀerent productivities across
occupations. Workers underlying productivity is revealed over time aﬀecting worker’s wage
and occupational mobility decisions. In my model types are known but evolve over time. I
show that in the model, supermodularity of the production function is suﬃcient for positive
assortative matching among agents starting a new relationship.
The paper is related to a large literature that, starting with the seminal contributions
of Roy (1951), Tinbergen (1951) and Koopmans and Beckmann (1957), have used static as-
signment models to address economic problems where indivisible characteristics of matched
1partners are fundamental1. For instance, these models has been widely used to study the
distributions of earnings (see Sattinger (1993) for a review) and to explain the formation
of production teams. Becker (1973) popularized this type of models to explain how people
choose to marry and Garicano (2000) uses similar ideas to model hierarchies and the organi-
zation of knowledge. More recently, assignment models have been used to explain CEO earn-
ings (Gabaix and Landier (2008) and Tervio (2008)) and to explain the increase in the level
and dispersion of house prices across U.S. metropolitan areas (Van Nieuwerburgh and Weill
(2006)). The list of applications is, of course, much longer, since situations where agent
characteristics matter for the outcome of an association are varied and large.
In spite of the many useful insights from the static assignment model, it is easy to
imagine situations where agents’ characteristics change over time and push people to break
their current matches. For instance, people change and a marriage that looked ideal when
it was formed could become far from ideal some years later. In fact, in 2001, 13% of men
and 14% of women had married twice, and around 3% had married three or more times
(see Kreider (2005)). The same is true for a ﬁrm - CEO relationship, since a manager that
was ideal under some ﬁrm conditions could become the wrong one when those conditions
change. For instance, a number between 10% and 15% of CEO leave their position in
a typical year (see Kaplan and Minton (2006) and reference therein). In the same vein,
Holmes and Schmitz (1996) using data from 1982 Characteristics of Business Owners shows
that transferred businesses as a percentage of all surviving businesses is around 5% if the
business is managed by the founder, and between 16% and 27% otherwise, depending on the
age of the business (see also Holmes and Schmitz (1995)).
But we see not only that incentives to remain paired change over time, but also that
those non-ideal matches are not immediately destroyed despite there are better possibilities
in the market. This means that, at least for a time, matches that are not ideal keep working
together.
The importance of mismatch for total factor prductivity level has been recently em-
phasized in the developmentliterature. According to Restuccia and Rogerson (2008) how
aggregate resources are allocated across uses is important for the understanding of cross-
country diﬀerences in per capita incomes. Hsieh and Klenow (2007) make a similar claim
after studying the case of manufacturing in China and India. In particular, according to
these authors, if productive factors were reallocated to ”equalize marginal products to the
extent observed in the U.S.” these countries would realize TFP gains of more that 30%. This
paper diﬀers from that literature in two respects. First, here I analyze indivisible factors
misallocation rather than the misallocation of divisible factors, like capital and labor, and so
an assignment problem arises. Indivisible production factors are critical for productivity. An
example of an indivisible productive factor that have had large attention in the literature is
managerial talent (see for example, Bloom and Reenen (2007)). Second, the misallocation of
resources here is endogenous, in the sense that it arises from optimizing agents that consider
the trade-oﬀ between gains and losses of being incorrectly matched. A tentative conclusion
1For a recent theoretical treatment of this kind of model, see Legros and Newman (2002) and
Legros and Newman (2007). Assignment models are usually analyzed in competitive and frictionless market
environments. For an alternative approach that considers search frictions see Shimer and Smith (2000).
2from the numerical exercise presented at the end of the chapter is that it is diﬃcult to ﬁnd
important aggregate eﬀects of endogenous misallocation. The problem is that misallocation
is important only when types are very diﬀerent, but it is in these situations that incen-
tives to tolerate mismatches are low, and a huge cost of rematching is needed to see large
productivity eﬀects.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 presents the model and shows that
equilibrium exists. Section 3 constructs and proves the existence of an equilibrium charac-
terized by (i) a positive assortative matching between agents that decide to re-match and
(ii) bands of inaction for existing matches. Section 4 describes the algorithm used to ﬁnd the
equilibrium. Section 5 shows that the model could be interpreted as solving for per period
payments rather than expected present value, an interpretation that relevant for some em-
pirical applications. Section 6 further characterizes the equilibrium by analyzing the eﬀects
of various changes in model parameters on model outcomes. Section 7 extends the model
in two diﬀerent ways. First, introduces tenure eﬀects and second allows for a more general
stochastic process. Section 8 concludes. The main proofs are in the appendix.
2 The model
The model is an stochastic dynamic extension of the “diﬀerential rents” model of Sattinger
(1979) that allows for time varying characteristics2. A cost of re-matching that generates
endogenous mismatch in equilibrium is introduced. To be more concrete in the exposition
of the model, I will name the sides of the match entrepreneurs and ﬁrms. Entrepreneurs
are endowed with a time invariant talent to manage ﬁrms. Firms, in contrast, have a time
varying productivity3. Entrepreneurs buy and sell ﬁrms in a competitive market.
Setup There is a continuum of entrepreneurs and ﬁrms which mass is normalized to 1.
Entrepreneurs diﬀer in their time invariant ability to manage a ﬁrm a ∈ A =[aL,aH] ∈ R+,
which is distributed across them according to a continuous probability distribution function
H (a) with density function h(a). Firms, in turn, are characterized by a productivity level
b ∈ B = [bL,bH] ∈ R+, which, in a departure from the standard assignment models, is
allowed to evolve over time. I make the following assumptions about stochastic process for
ﬁrm productivity:
Assumption 1 Given any current productivity b, with intensity λ the productivity level
change to b′ ∼ G(.), where G(.) is a distribution function with support B and with density
function 0 < pg ≤ g (.) ≤ Pg < ∞ for all b in B.
Assumption 2 0 < ph ≤ h(.) ≤ Ph < ∞ for all a in A.
2For a good description of Sattinger (1979) model (and for a complete survey on assignment models) see
Sattinger (1993). The model has been used recently by Tervio (2008) and Gabaix and Landier (2008) to
explain the evolution of CEO earnings.
3The model could be extended to have stochastic types on both sides. However, for expositional purposes
I consider time variability in only one side. In the appendix I explain how the model works when both sides
have stochastic types.
3Here λ is a measure of shock persistence. In particular, a higher value of λ implies a
less persistent shock, since the intensity at which productivity changes is higher when λ
is higher. This speciﬁcation was used, for example, by Asplund and Nocke (2006) in their
investigation of the eﬀect of ﬁxed costs and market size on entry and exit rates and the age
distribution of ﬁrms. The critical implication of assumption 1 is that whenever a ﬁrm is hit
by a shock, the new productivity level is independent of the old one4.
The production unit in the economy is an entrepreneur - ﬁrm matched pair (a,b). Each
pair produces an amount determined by the production function f (a,b), which is assumed
to be continuous, continuously diﬀerentiable, bounded on the support of a and b and strictly
increasing in both of its arguments. Both characteristics, a and b, are complements in
production. More formally,
Assumption 3 (Strict Super Modularity) The production function f (a,b) is strictly
supermodular. That is, for a1 > a2 and b1 > b2, f (a1,b1)+f (a2,b2) > f (a1,b2)+f (a2,b1).
Equivalently, since f (a,b) is diﬀerentiable, fab (a,b) > 0.
At any point in time, entrepreneurs can sell and buy ﬁrms in a competitive and frictionless
market (i.e. there is no search or any other friction).5 However, every time a new ﬁrm is
bought, the entrepreneur has to pay a ﬁxed and sunk cost c ≥ 0. To avoid complications due
to entry and exit, I assume that both outside options of entrepreneurs and ﬁrms scrap value
are low enough such that all types participate in this market. Finally, for technical reasons
that will become apparent later, I assume that with intensity η >0 matches are broken.
This value could be as close to zero as desired, so in any quantitative application its eﬀect
is negligible. I analyze the steady state of this economy.
Entrepreneur problem Entrepreneurs face two problems. First, they must decide be-
tween keeping or changing the ﬁrm they currently have. Second, if they decide to change
the ﬁrm, they must choose which type of ﬁrm to buy.
Starting with the second problem, let V (b) denotes the price of a ﬁrm with current
productivity b and M (a,b) the value of a match between a ﬁrm with productivity b and an
entrepreneur with talent a. The problem of an entrepreneur with talent a that is looking for
a ﬁrm to buy is then
max
x {M (a,x) − V (x) − c}. (1)
That is, when buying a ﬁrm, entrepreneurs choose the ﬁrm that maximizes the diﬀerence
between the value of a particular ﬁrm under their property, M (a,x), and the cost of such a
ﬁrm V (x) minus starting cost c.
4This property substantially simpliﬁes the characterization of the equilibrium, since it helps to forward
super modularity from the production function to the value functions, which is not necessarily true for
more complex stochastic process. However, there are some unsatisfactory consequences of assumption 1. In
particular, since new b′s are independent of old ones, any ”learning” type interpretation of the stochastic
process is ruled out. In section 7 I generalize the process assumed in 1 by letting the new productivity of
the ﬁrm be a function of current entrepreneur ability.
5The model could be easily reinterpreted to accommodate an alternative market structure where ﬁrms
with time-varying productivity hire managers.
4Let W (a) := maxx {M (a,x) − V (x) − c} denote the output of this maximization prob-
lem. Then the gain of changing ﬁrm for a type a entrepreneur currently producing with a
type b ﬁrm is W (a)+V (b), since she may always sell the ﬁrm at V (b) and start again buying
the ﬁrm she prefers and obtaining W (a). Therefore, the problem of a type a entrepreneur
that owns a ﬁrm with current productivity b is described by the following Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman (HJB) equation,
rM (a,b) =






W (a) + V (b′)
 
G(db′) − M (a,b)
 
+η {W (a) + V (b) − M (a,b)}.
(2)
That is, for a type a entrepreneur the ﬂow value rM (a,b) of having a type b ﬁrm is
equal to the production ﬂow f (a,b) plus the expected capital gain or loss that occurs either
when productivity changes or when the match is exogenously destroyed. In particular, with
intensity λ productivity of the ﬁrm changes from b to b′ and in this event the entrepreneur can
either keep the ﬁrm with a capital gain/loss of M (a,b′)−M (a,b), or sell it at a price V (b′).
In the latter case she would get W (a), with a capital gain equal to W (a)+V (b′)−M (a,b).
Of course, the sale will occur only if the value of doing so is greater than the value of keeping
the ﬁrm with the new productivity b′. Finally, in the case of an exogenous destruction,
capital gains/losses are equal to W (a) + V (b) − M (a,b).
The solution to entrepreneur problem can be characterized by two objects. A set B(a) ∈
B of ﬁrm productivities that are acceptable for a entrepreneur with talent a and a ﬁrm
productivity level β (a) ∈ B(a) that an entrepreneur a would like to buy in case she decide
to change ﬁrms6. An important property of the value of a match (a,b) is the following.
Proposition 4 M (a,b) is supermodular.
Proof. It follows directly from equation (2), since the cross derivative is
fab(a,b)
r+λ+η > 0 by
assumption 3.
The market for ﬁrms The solution to entrepreneur’s problem induce a mass of ﬁrms
of diﬀerent types that are for sale and a mass of entrepreneurs of diﬀerent talents that are
looking for new ﬁrms. Let A ∈ A be a subset of entrepreneur types and D(A) the mass of
managers with talent a ∈ A that are looking for a new ﬁrm. In the same vein, let B ∈ B
be a subset of ﬁrm types and S (B) the mass of ﬁrms with productivity b ∈ B that are for
sale. Note that β (A) is the subset of ﬁrm types chosen by entrepreneurs in A. The market
for ﬁrms will be in equilibrium when D(A) = S (β (A)) for all A ⊆ A. That is, when the
mass of entrepreneurs looking for a particular subset of ﬁrm types is equal to the mass of
this subset of ﬁrm types in the market.
Equilibrium An equilibrium in this economy is as follows,
6So far, there is nothing proving that there is only one ﬁrm type that solves equation (1), but I show
below that this will be the case, so, I treat β (a) as a function.
5Deﬁnition 5 An equilibrium in this economy is characterized by a price function V : B → R;
an assignment function β : A → B; and inaction sets B(a) for all a, such that given the
payment function V (b), the assignment function β (a) and the inaction set B(a) (i) solve
entrepreneur problem and (ii) S (A) = D(β (A)) for all A ⊆ A.
3 Equilibrium construction
In this section I construct and prove the existence of an equilibrium characterized by (i)
a positive assortative matching between agents that decide to re-match and (ii) bands of
inaction for existing matches.
Positive assortative matching in the market for ﬁrms means that the equilibrium assign-
ment is given by a bijective function, that with some abuse of notation, I denote by β (a),
with β (aL) = bL, β (aH) = bH and β′ (a) > 0 for all a ∈ A.
As in any assignment model, both the assignment problem and the price functions are
solved simultaneously. However, there is a critical diﬀerence between the dynamic version
of the model presented here and the standard static one that has been used in the litera-
ture. Here the assignment problem is between populations of ﬁrms and entrepreneurs that,
endogenously, decide to go to the market, and not between the whole population of both
types of managers and ﬁrms. The later implies that, even with positive assortative matching
in the market for ﬁrms, I cannot use the known distribution of talent and productivity to
infer the assignment function. Here the assignment function is the solution to a ﬁxed point
problem.
For expositional purposes, I will describe the payment functions ﬁrst and I will postpone
the discussion of the assignment function to section 3.3. In that section I show that, under
assumptions (1) and (3), in equilibrium there exists a increasing bijective function β : A → B
that speciﬁes the type of ﬁrm β (a) that is bought by an entrepreneur with talent a.
3.1 Equilibrium ﬁrm price, V (b)
Consider an entrepreneur that is looking for a new ﬁrm. In particular, think about the
entrepreneur who chooses optimally to buy a type b ﬁrm and denote her talent by α(b).
Clearly, α(b) is the inverse function of β (a). Optimality implies that for any ε > 0 it has
to be the case that W (α(b)) ≥ M (α(b),b + ε) − V (b + ε) − c. That is, an entrepreneur of
talent α(b) that is looking for a new ﬁrm prefers to buy a ﬁrm b to any other one. Re-writing
this expression in terms of the value of the match, M (α(b),b), in equilibrium the following
condition must be true,
M (α(b),b) − V (b) ≥ M (α(b),b + ε) − V (b + ε). (3)
Dividing equation (3) by ε and letting ε → 0 I get a condition for the change in the value
of the ﬁrm due to a (inﬁnitesimal) change in productivity,
V
′ (b) = Mb (α(b),b). (4)
6That is, in equilibrium, the marginal value of an improvement in productivity V ′ (b) is equal
to the marginal value for the equilibrium match, Mb (α(b),b). From equation (2) it is clear
that, for any (a,b), Mb (a,b) =
fb(a,b)
r+λ+η.
Equation (4) only determines the slope of the ﬁrm price function V (b). In order to get
an equation for the price, it is necessary to specify boundary conditions. I have assumed
that both entrepreneurs and ﬁrms have a very low value outside the market, so all of them
decide to participate. In order to ﬁnd the boundary conditions, consider the value of the
match between the worst entrepreneur and the worst ﬁrm, M (aL,bL), and assume that it
is divided between both sides in proportions 0 < δ < 1 for the entrepreneur and 1 − δ for
the ﬁrm. Clearly, (1 − δ)M (aL,bL) is a lower bound for ﬁrm price, since any ﬁrm in the
economy has an equal or greater productivity level b. Then M (aL,b) ≥ M (aL,bL) for all
b. Same argument implies that δM (aL,bL) is the lower bound for entrepreneur value. Any
division will be an equilibrium since both sides strictly prefer to participate in the market.
As is common in the literature, this problem could be rationalized as a Nash bargaining
problem with δ being the entrepreneur’s bargain power. In what follows I assume δ = 1, so
the value of the worst ﬁrm is set to 0. Then, assortative matching in ﬁrm market implies





r + λ + η
dx. (5)
Note that, because V ′ (b) =
fb(α(b),b)
r+λ+η , and in contrast to models where factors are fully
divisible (i.e. models without assignment problem), changes in the value V (b) due to im-
provements in productivity depend on both the marginal product of b and the entrepreneur
that would be ”assigned” in the market to manage a ﬁrm of productivity b. That is, a
small increase in productivity could lead to a large increase in ﬁrm value if the talent of the
entrepreneur that will manage the ﬁrm improves a lot. In general, it is diﬃcult to obtain a
closed form solution for α(b) and so equation (5) must be solved numerically7.
The next proposition establishes that under this payment function entrepreneurs does
not want to deviate from the assignment β (a).
Proposition 6 Assume that prices are set according to equation 5, then the assignment
function β (a) coincide with entrepreneurs optimal choice.
Proof. I derived the price function V (b) assuming that the assignment function β (a) was
equal to entrepreneurs optimal choice. To see that this is actually the case, let W (a|b) =
M (a,b)−V (b)−c denote the value of a type a entrepreneur that bought a ﬁrm of productivity
b. The optimality of the assignment β (a) follows from the fact that, assuming (3) and
(1), this function is strictly concave with respect to b and has a unique maximum at β (a)
for all a ∈ A. To see this, note that the ﬁrst derivative of W (a|b) with respect to b is
Mb (a,b) − Mb (α(b),b), and that by supermodularity of M (.): (i) if b = β (a) then this
derivative is 0, (ii) if b > β (a) then α(b) > a and this derivative is negative, and (iii) if
b < β (a) then α(b) < a and this derivative is positive.
7In section 4 I present the algorithm used to compute the assignment function.
73.2 Inaction sets and separation policy
Now I turn to the separation policy. A direct implication of proposition (6) is that there is
a simple rule to break up a match. To ﬁnd this rule note that the set B(a) of acceptable
ﬁrm types for an entrepreneur with ability a is determined as follows,
B(a) := {b ∈ B : W (a|b) ≥ W (a) − c},
and note that since proposition (6) implies that W (a|b) is strictly concave with a maximum





deﬁned by the solution to W (a|b) = W (a) − c. More precisely, proposition (6) implies that
there are at most two solutions to this equation in B, one greater than β (a) and the other
smaller. In the case where there is no solution for the lower bound (upper bound) in B, the
lower (upper) boundary is just bL (bH). This interval deﬁnes an inaction band such that
the best response to a change in productivity that retains the ﬁrm inside the interval is to
keep the ﬁrm. Therefore, the separation policy is: sell the ﬁrm whenever productivity shock




and keep the ﬁrm otherwise. It is plain that the
functions b(a) and b(a) deﬁning the boundaries of the inaction band are non decreasing and
continuous functions of a. (See ﬁgure 2)
For ﬁxed b, it is possible to obtain the set of entrepreneurs’ talents that in equilibrium may
be working with a type b ﬁrm. This set is an interval of R+ with boundaries {a(b),a(b)} ⊆ A
deﬁned by,
A(b) := {a ∈ A : W (a|b) ≥ W (a) − c}.
3.3 The assignment function and the market clearing condition
So far, I have assumed that the assignment function β (a), indicating the type of ﬁrm bought
by an entrepreneur a, exists and could be inverted to obtain α(b). In this section I show that
this is indeed the case and I characterize this function. In order to do that, it is necessary
to specify the supply and demand for ﬁrms described in section 2.
Let ̟(a) = λPr[b / ∈ B(a)] denotes the intensity at which entrepreneurs type a get a
shock bad enough to make them to look for a new ﬁrm. Then ̟(a) + η is the intensity at
which type a entrepreneurs sell their ﬁrms and the mass of entrepreneurs with talent less




h(x)[̟(x) + η]dx. (6)
To compute the supply of ﬁrms with productivity less than b consider the set A(b) of
entrepreneurs that would accept to work with ﬁrms with productivity b, and note that the
law of large number implies that the mass of entrepreneurs that will never buy a ﬁrm b is
given by ω (b) = Pr[a / ∈ A(b)]. Recall that at a rate λ a ﬁrm own by entrepreneurs in the
complement of A(b) is hit by a productivity shock from the distribution G(.), therefore
λg (b)ω (b) is the measure of type b ﬁrm that are sold by those entrepreneur. Then, the
8supply of ﬁrms with productivity level less than b is given by,
S (b) = λ
  b
bL
g (x)[ω (x) + η]dx. (7)
Of course, the total mass of entrepreneurs and ﬁrms in the market are the same in
equilibrium, since every broken match means that one entrepreneur and one ﬁrm are going
to the market. Let   = D(bH) = S (aH) be this mass, then S (a)/  and D(b)/  are the
distribution functions of talent and productivity in the market.
The market clearing condition is derive as follows. Supermodularity of the match value
function implies positive assortative matching in the market for ﬁrms, that is, the worst
available ﬁrm is bought by the worst entrepreneur that is looking for a ﬁrm and so on.
Then, entrepreneurs of talent α(b) or less are working for ﬁrms with productivity b or less.
The market clearing condition may be written as follows,
D(α(b)) = S (b), all b ∈ B. (8)
The equilibrium assignment function is the one that simultaneously solves equation (8)
and satisﬁes the value functions in section 3.1. To prove the existence of the function α(b)
note that there are two maps describing the equilibrium in the model: one from assignment
functions to inaction sets (discussed in section 3.1) and the other from inaction sets to
assignment functions (the market clearing condition in this section). These two maps deﬁne
the ﬁxed point problem in equation (8). The next proposition establishes that there is an
assignment function that solves the ﬁxed point problem in equation (8).
Proposition 7 Assume (1) and (3), there exists an increasing continuous bijective function
α : B → A that solves equation (8).
Proof. See appendix B.
Proposition 8 A positive assortative equilibrium exists.
Proof. By propositions 6 and 7 there exists a positive assortative assignment and associated
payment function such that market clears and nobody wants to deviate.
4 Algorithm
As was pointed out above, in general, it is not possible to get an analytical solution to
the assignment function α(b). In this section I show the algorithm used to compute the
equilibrium. The idea is basically to ﬁnd a ﬁxed point of an operator that maps the space of
increasing continuous bijective functions that go from B → A into itself. To construct this
operator I start by diﬀerentiating the equilibrium condition in equation (8),
α
′ (b) =
g (b)(ω (b) + η)
h(α(b))(̟(α(b)) + η)
. (9)
9Let H (x,y) =
g(x)(ω(x)+η)
h(y)(̟(y)+η) and note that positive assortative matching implies α(bL) = aL.
Then, integrating equation (9), it is easy to see that the assignment function α(b) is the
ﬁxed point of the following functional equation:




In appendix B I show that the solution to this problem is given by the ﬁxed point of the
following mapping,
T (α)(b) := a0 +
  b
b0
  H (x,α(x))dx, (11)
where   H (x,y) =
aH−aL
κ(α) H (x,y) and κ (α) =
  bH
bL H (x,α(x))dx.
5 Per period payments
So far, I have set up the problem in terms of present values, but for some quantitative
applications it is convenient to use per period ﬂow payments. For example, if the model is
applied to manager compensation and ﬁrm value questions as in Gabaix and Landier (2008)
and Tervio (2008), one could replace the entrepreneur by a manager and think about a ﬁrm
hiring a manger instead of a entrepreneur buying a ﬁrm. In this case one would be interested
in the ﬂow payment of the manager instead of the expected present value of those payments.
Fortunately, the model could be solved under both interpretations 8. Let φ(b) be the ﬁrm per
period (or rental value of a ﬁrm type b) and let w(a|b) be the per period payment received
by a talent a entrepreneur managing a type b ﬁrm. To compute φ(b) note that the price of
a type b ﬁrm has to satisﬁes the following HJB equation
rV (b) = φ(b) + (λ + η)E{V (b
′) − V (b)}. (12)
Here the function V (b) is just the ﬁrm price found in equation (5).
Entrepreneur per period ﬂow w(a|b) could be obtained using the fact that f (a,b) =
w(a|b) + φ(b). Again, it is not possible to get closed form solutions in general, but several
aspects of those functions could be stated. First, note that the slope of the ﬁrm per period
ﬂow is φ′ (b) = fb (α(b),b). As with function V (b), the slope of the per period ﬂow payment
depends both on the marginal product of b and the entrepreneur that manages the ﬁrm in
equilibrium, α(b). The concavity or convexity of the payment function φ(b) will depend on
two forces. To see this, note that diﬀerentiating φ(b) twice, the second derivative of ﬁrm
per period payment ﬂow is given by φ′′ (b) = [fb,b (α(b),b) + fa,b (α(b),b)α′ (b)]. The ﬁrst
force is the behavior of the marginal product of b, fb,b (α(b),b). The second depends on
the complementarity and the change in the type of entrepreneur that would be optimally
assigned to the ﬁrm in equilibrium, fa,b (α(b),b)α′ (b).
With respect to entrepreneur per period ﬂow, the condition f (a,b) = w(a|b) + φ(b)
implies that the relation between entrepreneur payment and changes in ﬁrm productivity is
8Of course, this not the only per period payment structure consistent with the equilibrium.
10governed by wb (a|b) = fb (a|b) − fb (α(b),b). That is, it depends on the diﬀerence between
the eﬀect of productivity change on production in the ﬁrm with the current entrepreneur
and in a ﬁrm managed by the optimal entrepreneur. Of course, if a = α(b) the wage is
in its maximum level and so wb (a|b) = 0. Whenever a > α(b), supermodularity of the
production function implies that wb (a,b) > 0 and then wages increase with b. In the same
vein, a < α(b) implies that wb (a|b) < 0 and then wages decrease with b. Then, for any given
a the wage function is a concave function of b with a unique maximum at α(b).
Discussion Let us consider entrepreneur payment w(a|b). First, note that conditional on
a there is a distribution of payments w(a|b). Indeed, as was pointed out above, w(a|b) is
equal to f (a,b) − φ(b), and because in equilibrium entrepreneurs of the same type a are
working for ﬁrms with diﬀerent productivity b, it has to be the case that entrepreneurs with
the same talent get diﬀerent payments. This in contrast with standard assignment models
were conditional on factors characteristic there is a unique equilibrium payment.
How w(a|b) changes with a or b? Let start ﬁxing a and consider the eﬀects a small moves
in productivity. In the model, the relation between ﬁrm productivity and the wage of a type
a entrepreneur is non monotonic. Actually, the non monotonicity between ﬁrms productivity
and entrepreneur payment is at the core of assignment models, where, in equilibrium, it is
not in the best interest of one side to be matched with the best of the other side, but every
one has a preferred type to be matched with. To see this, note that the maximum possible
payment for an entrepreneur of talent a occurs when she is paired with a ﬁrm of productivity
β (a). If with the passage of time the productivity of the ﬁrm decreases, both the production
of the ﬁrm f (a,b) and the ﬁrm payment φ(b) decrease, but supermodularity implies that,
given a, f (a,b) decreases more than φ(b) and therefore entrepreneur per period payment
decreases too. Eventually, if the productivity of the ﬁrm decreases too much, the match
will be destroyed. A similar process occurs when the productivity of the ﬁrm increases. In
this case f (a,b) increases less than φ(b) and therefore the entrepreneur per period payment
decreases. Then an increase in the productivity of the ﬁrm will generate an increase in the
payment of the entrepreneurs only when the ﬁrm is getting closer to the ”optimal” ﬁrm for
a given talent of the entrepreneur from below (i.e. from a productivity level smaller than
β (a)). On the other hand, an increase in productivity will be associated with a decrease in
entrepreneur payment if the improvement in productivity moves the ﬁrm above her ”optimal”
ﬁrm type. In order to have a monotonic positive correlation between ﬁrm productivity and
entrepreneur payment it would be necessary to introduce some match-speciﬁc component
with no value outside the ﬁrm, as in Jovanovic (1979). In section 7 I go over this issue,
extending the model to allow for tenure eﬀects in the match production function.
Now, let set b to see how w(a|b) change with a. In this case the relation is always positive:
an increase in a is always related to an increase in w(a|b). The intuition here is much more
natural: entrepreneurs are compensated only for relative performance. For a ﬁxed a level of
productivity b, the typical ﬁrm will produce f (α(b),b) and the ﬁrm will require a payment
φ(b). Those managers working for ﬁrms of productivity b with talent greater than α(b) will
get more than w(α(b)|b), since they have to make the same payment φ(b) to the ﬁrm, and
those with less talent will get less. Then, conditional on ﬁrm type, ﬁrms that are doing
11better pay more than ﬁrms that are doing worse than the average.
6 Comparative statics
In this section I further characterize the equilibrium by studying the interaction between a
change in model parameters and the shape of the inaction bands, the assignment function
and the payment function. I also explore the eﬀects of changes in the cost of re-matching and
the persistence of the shock on the distribution of factor payments. I compare the results
with ones obtained in a static model.
6.1 Inaction bands and turnover
Let me start by analyzing the behavior of the inaction bands and turnover. First, remember
that for a given a the boundaries of the inaction set B(a) are the solution to W (a|b) −
W (a) = −c (of course, if there is no solution to this equation for b ∈ B, the values of the
boundaries are equal to the the upper or lower bound of B for the upper and lower boundary
respectively). Figure 1 shows the value of W (a|b) − W (a) as a function of b for a given
value of a. As was stated above this function is concave with a unique maximum at β (a).
It is clear from panel (i) in ﬁgure 1 that as c increases so does the inaction band, since the
intersection points with the line representing the cost of re-matching move away. A similar
eﬀect has an increase in λ, as is shown in panel (ii) of the same ﬁgure. An increase in
λ means that the shock has less persistence. Then the cost of the mismatch is smaller in
present value. For a given cost of re-match, there is more tolerance for matching with the
wrong partner and so the inaction band increases.
How does the shape of the inaction sets change with diﬀerently shaped production func-
tions? Production functions matter because the marginal product of each factor is relevant
for entrepreneur decisions. However, as was mentioned above, what really matters in assign-
ment models is the combination of marginal product of the factor in a traditional sense and
the relative scarcity of the factor characteristic that, in turn, depends on the distribution of
each characteristic. In order not to confuse these two elements, let me assume for now that
both the productivity and the ability of the entrepreneurs come from a uniform distribution.
In this case the eﬀect of changes in the production function could be analyzed in isolation.
Figure 2 shows the inaction band for two diﬀerent production functions. Panel (i) of ﬁgure
2 shows the inaction band for the same production function of ﬁgure 1, f (a,b) = ab and
panel (ii) of ﬁgure 2 does the same for the production function f (a,b) = a
1−b. In the ﬁrst
case the marginal product of a is proportional to b and so the width of the inaction band
is constant (for interior points). In contrast, in panel (ii) of ﬁgure 2 the marginal product
increases more than proportional to b. In this case the inaction band is smaller for higher a,
since for them the cost of moving away from the optimal level of b is higher. This example
also helps to understand the eﬀect of a change in the distribution of factor characteristics.
To see this, note that having a production function a
1−b where both a and b are distributed
uniformly [0,1], is equivalent to having a production function ab with b following a Pareto





































































Figure 1: Policy rule. These ﬁgures depict the function Ω(a,b) = W (a,b) − W (a,β (a)) for a = 0.5,
f (a,b) = ab and uniform distributions functions H (.) and G(.) with support [0,1]. In part (i) λ = 0.1. In
part (ii) λ is set at 0.1 in the continuous red line and at 0.25 in the dashed blue line. The horizontal black
lines represent the re-matching cost. The cut oﬀ values b(a) and b(a) (i.e., the boundaries of the inaction
set) are the values of b for which the function Ω(a,b) intersects the value of the re-matching cost c.
higher productivity becomes relatively more scarce the inaction band becomes thinner.
Finally, the behavior of manager turnover mimics the behavior of the inaction band. In
particular, thinner inaction bands imply more turnover.
6.2 Assignment Function
An obvious question is if the presence of a ﬁxed cost of re-matching changes the shape of
the assignment function relative to the case where the cost does not exist. The answer is, in
general, yes.
As is clear from equation (9), in the dynamic assignment model, the assignment function
depends critically on the functions ̟(a) = λPr[b / ∈ B(a)] and ω (b) = λPr[a / ∈ A(b)].
That is, the function depends on the probability that the new productivity shock is outside
the entrepreneur’s inaction set and the probability that new inaction set does not contain
the current entrepreneur ability (times the intensity of the shock).
To analyze the eﬀects of changes in c let assume that G(.) and H (.) are uniform distribu-
tion functions. In this case, equation (9) becomes
ω(x)+η
̟(x)+η and then the assignment function
is just α(b) = b when c = 0 since in this case ω (.) = ̟(.) = λ. However, when c  = 0 this
ratio is, in general, diﬀerent from 1, and so the shape of the assignment function is diﬀerent
from the case when c = 0, as the following example shows.
Example 9 Consider f (a,b) = aθabθb, and let H (.) and G(.) be uniform distribution func-
tions with support in [0,1]. Assume that, as in the case with c = 0, α(b) = b regardless the











































































Figure 2: Inaction bands.
These ﬁgures depict the boundaries of the inaction set B(a) for all values of talent a, λ = 0.25, c = 0.3 and
uniform distributions functions H (.) and G(.) with support [0,0.9]. The production function is f (a,b) = ab
in part (i) and f (a,b) = a
1−b in part (ii). The continuous red lines are the upper and lower boundaries
and the dashed blue line is the assignment function β (a). The picture in part (ii) is also the picture for a
production function f (a,b) = ab with H (.) uniform with support [0,0.9] and G(.) Pareto with parameter
1.
14value for c. In this example I show that if c > 0 this could not be the equilibrium assignment
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This ratio is equal to 1 only if θa = θb. So, if θa  = θb, the assignment function α(b) = b
could not be an equilibrium object.
This result is actually more general as the following remark states.
Remark 10 Assume H (.) = G(.) and symmetric production function f (x,y) = f (y,x)
then
ω(x)+η
̟(α(x))+η = 1 for all values of b, and the assignment function is α(b) = H−1 (G(b))
independent of c and λ.
The idea is that in the symmetric case the inaction are also symmetric. Then, in general,
c > 0 will change the shape of the assignment function. The way the assignment function
will change depends on how the functions ̟(a) and ω (b) change with c.
6.3 Steady state distribution and endogenous mismatch
The steady state distribution of matches (a,b) is as follows. Let
σ (a,b) =
 
h(a)g (b) b ∈ B(a)
0 otherwise , (13)
and
Σ(b|a) =
    b
b0 σ (x,y)dxdy b < β (a)
h(a)[Pr[b / ∈ B(a)]] +
  b
b0 σ (a,y)dxdy b ≥ β (a)
. (14)





It is easy to see that in equilibrium the actual productive pairs (a,b) will not be positive
assortative, in the sense that there will be high and low values of a matched with the same
productivity type b. The level of mismatch will depend on the size of the inaction bands and






































This ﬁgure depicts the correlation between a and b for diﬀerent values of the re-matching cost (measured as
% of average payment of the agent) for uniform distributions functions H (.) and G(.) with support [0,0.9]
and production function f (a,b) = a
1−b. The continuous blue line is drawn for λ = 0.1 while the dashed red
line is drawn for λ = 0.3. Results are based in a Montecarlo simulation.
therefore on the elements that modiﬁed them (see section 6.1). To get a sense of the degree
of the misallocation ﬁgure 3 shows the correlation between a and b for diﬀerent values of
the re-matching cost and persistence of the shock. Of course, if c = 0 there is no mismatch
and the correlation is one for any value of λ. As the cost of re-matching increases, the
inaction band becomes wider and the correlation decreases. The eﬀect is larger, the lower
the persistence of the shock. When λ = 0.1 (the blue line in ﬁgure 3) the eﬀect of higher
values of c is smaller, reducing the correlation from 100% to around 95% when the cost of
re-matching is around 37% of the average per period payment of the entrepreneur. In the
case of lower persistence, λ = 0.3, the eﬀect is more pronounced as shown by the red line:
the correlation goes down to 87% when the cost of re-match goes to 35% of the value of the
average entrepreneur payment.
6.4 Factor payment distribution
Finally, I show the eﬀect of the re-matching cost on factor payment distributions, where the
payments are computed as the per period ﬂows in section 5. As a benchmark I consider the
factor payment distribution when c = 0. Figure 4 shows the histogram of the entrepreneurs’
wage (relative to the wage when c = 0). Part (i) of this ﬁgure is the distribution conditional
on a = 0.45 and part (ii) is the wage distribution conditioned on b = 0.45. In both cases the
black ﬁlled bars are for the benchmark case, and the unﬁlled bars represent the case where
c = 0.3.



























































Figure 4: (Conditional) wage distribution.
These ﬁgures depict wage histograms (relative to c = 0) conditional on a = 0.45 - part (i) - and conditional
on b = 0.45 - part (ii) - for uniform distributions functions H (.) and G(.) with support [0,0.9], production
function f (a,b) = a
1−b and λ = 0.3. White bars are drawn for c = 0.3 and black ones for c = 0. Results are
based on a Montecarlo simulation.
with his perfect mate, the conditional distribution is concentrated in one point. In contrast,
when c = 0.3, there is endogenous mismatch and so the distribution of wages is not con-
centrated in a point. In particular, conditional on talent a = 0.45 (part i), the majority of
entrepreneurs are matched with the ideal ﬁrm (60% of this type of entrepreneurs are in this
situation). The rest get a lower payment since they are working for ﬁrm diﬀerent from the
optimal. The reduction in the payment is, of course, limited by the ability of entrepreneurs
to sell the ﬁrm. Part (ii) presents the same exercise but ﬁxing the type of ﬁrm at b = 0.45.
The largest portion of entrepreneurs managing this type of ﬁrm, around 50%, has the ideal
level of talent for a ﬁrm with productivity b = 0.45 (α(0.45)) and gets a payment similar
to the equilibrium one in the case of no cost of re-matching. The diﬀerence occurs because
the assignment function changes a little bit and because the value of a match is smaller
because the cost of re-matching is higher. With costly re-matching, there are entrepreneurs
managing this type of ﬁrm that have more or less talent than the ”ideal” one, and so some
of them are earning more and others are earning less than the ”ideal” one.
Figure (5) presents the same exercise for the distribution of ﬁrm value9. Conditional on
a = 0.45, the distribution of ﬁrm values is, of course, concentrated in one point when c = 0
and dispersed when c = 0.3, because in the latter case there are many types of ﬁrms own by
the entrepreneur with a = 0.45. That is, entrepreneurs with the same ability are managing
ﬁrms with diﬀerent values.
9Figure (5) does not show the histrogram of ﬁrm values conditional on b, since the value of the ﬁrm
conditional on b is the same for all a.




























Figure 5: (Conditional) ﬁrm value distribution. This ﬁgure depicts ﬁrm value histogram (relative
to c = 0) conditional on a = 0.45 for uniform distributions functions H (.) and G(.) with support [0,0.9],
production function f (a,b) = a
1−b and λ = 0.3. White bars are drawn for c = 0.3 and black ones for c = 0.
Results are based on a Montecarlo simulation.
Finally, ﬁgure (6) shows the (unconditional) distribution of wages and ﬁrm values for
c = 0 (the black ﬁlled bars) and for c = 0.3 (the unﬁlled bars). Starting with panel (ii),
note that the distribution of ﬁrms value is not aﬀected in any signiﬁcant way when the cost
of re-matching increases from 0 to 0.3. This occurs because, by assuming that all the cost
of re-match is paid by the entrepreneur, the value of the ﬁrm does not depend on which
entrepreneur is managing the ﬁrm. In contrast, the distribution of entrepreneur payments
changes a lot when c is increased from 0 to 0.3. As could be seen in panel (i), entrepreneur
payments are more dispersed and lower on average when the cost of re-matching increases.
This is a direct consequence of the misallocation of entrepreneurs to ﬁrms.
7 Extensions
In this section I present two extensions to the basic model. First, I introduce a tenure
eﬀect into the production function. The idea is that as time passes and the sides of the
match know each other better, productivity increases. This match-speciﬁc component has
no value outside the match and so makes starting a new partnership less attractive as time
passes, reducing the turnover with tenure, a fact that is common in many applications. The
second extension generalize the stochastic process in (1) by letting the new productivity level
depend on the type of entrepreneur that is managing the ﬁrm. The idea is that more talent
entrepreneurs have a higher probability of getting a higher productivity draw than less talent
ones.


















































Figure 6: Wage and ﬁrm value distribution.
These ﬁgures depict wage - part (i)) - and ﬁrm value - part (ii) - histograms for uniform distributions
functions H (.) and G(.) with support [0,0.9], production function f (a,b) = a
1−b and λ = 0.3. White bars
are drawn for c = 0.3 and black ones for c = 0. Results are based on a Montecarlo simulation.
7.1 Tenure eﬀects
In this section I consider a production function that is increasing in the duration of the
match. More formally,
Assumption 11 (Production function with tenure eﬀect) Let τ be the time a part-
nership has been producing together, the production function is given by f (a,b,τ) with
fτ (a,b,τ) > 0 and fa,b (a,b,τ) > 0 for all τ.





f (a,b,τ) + Mτ (a,b,τ)
+λ
  
max[M (a,b′,τ),W (a) + V (b′)]G(db′) − M (a,b,τ)
 






Besides the dependence on tenure, the major diﬀerence with respect to the value function in
equation (12) is that there is a new term, Mτ (a,b,τ), that reﬂects the eﬀect of seniority.
In order to use all the material from the basic model, it is useful to work with production
function that could be written as follows f (a,b,τ) = f1 (b,a)+f2 (a,τ). A simple inspection
of the value function above shows that in this case M (a,b,τ) = M1 (b,a)+M2 (a,τ). Under
this assumption, the supermodularity of the match value function follows trivially.
As before, Mb (a,b,τ) =
fb(a,b,τ)





r + λ + η
dx. (17)
19Given this, the equation that deﬁne the boundaries of the inaction bands is given by,
1
r + λ + η
 






Since f (a,b,τ) = f1 (b,a) + f2 (a,τ), this equation could be written as follows,
1
r + λ + η
 













τ (a,τ) > 0, having a tenure eﬀect is equivalent to having a setup cost that is increasing
with the tenure. Therefore, for any given pair (a,b) the inaction bands increase with tenure
and so match turnover decreases with time.













and then the clearing market condition in equation (8) is still valid.
7.2 State dependent shock
One of the implications of the stochastic process in assumption 1 is that after being hit
by a shock the new productivity level of the ﬁrm is independent of both the quality of the
entrepreneur in charge of the ﬁrm and the previous productivity level of the ﬁrm. In this
section I relax the ﬁrst assumption. In particular let me replace G(.) by G(.|a) in assumption
1.
The key issue is to verify that the match value function is still super modular. To see
that this is indeed the case note that, as in section 2, the match value function is just





′),W (a) + V (b
′)]G(db
′|a)} + η {W (a) + V (b)}.
then Ma,b (a,b) =
fa,b(a,b)
r+λ > 0, and, as before, the match value function is supermodular.
The assignment function will be diﬀerent, since a new source of interaction between
characteristics a and b has been added. Let g (b|a) = Gb (b|a) and g (b) =
  a1
a0 g (b|a)h(a)da,
then the supply of ﬁrms with productivity less or equal to b is given by
S (b) = λ
  b
b0
g (x)[ω (x) + η]dx.
where as before the function ω (b) = λPr[a / ∈ A(b)] is the intensity at which at which ﬁrms
with productivity level b go tothe market. The supply of ﬁrms is still given by equation (6)
and the equilibrium condition is again given by equation (8).
208 Conclusions
This paper presents a tractable assignment model that allows partners’ characteristics to
change over time. This extension is important, since it extends assignment models in a
way that permit the study of the dynamics of the matching process and the possibility of
equilibrium mismatch. It is not diﬃcult to imagine situations where this time variability of
partners’ characteristics is relevant and for which the static nature of previous assignment
models was a limitation. I hope the model presented here will be a useful framework in
which to study this type of problem.
One of the main contributions of the paper is to state conditions under which the model
is tractable. The paper contains proof of existence of the equilibrium, as well as an algorithm
to compute it. The paper also includes some extensions that could be important for empirical
applications. In particular, study the eﬀect of match-speciﬁc components, nesting traditional
assignments models in the style of Sattinger (1979) where partners characteristics could be
traded in a competitive market with papers in the line of Jovanovic (1979) that exploit the
eﬀect of productivity components useful only inside the match, but with no value outside.
Several extensions would enrich the analysis. In particular, a more general speciﬁcation
of the stochastic process would be useful if one would like to use the model in context of
learning.
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A Two sides stochastic types
As was pointed out in the text, the key element for existence of an equilibrium characterized
by (i) a positive assortative matching between entrepreneur types and ﬁrm productivity
levels in the market for ﬁrms and (ii) possible non assortative matching between ﬁrms and
entrepreneurs that decide not to go to the market is the supermodularity of the match-value
function. Here, I show that this is the case when both sides’ types are stochastic.
Assumption 12 Given any current entrepreneur type a, with intensity λa the productivity
level changes to a′ ∼ H (.), where H (.) is a distribution function with support in [aL,aH]
and with density function 0 < h(.) < ∞ for all a in [aL,aH].





f (a,b) + λa
  




max[M (a,b′),W (a) + V (b′)]G(db′) − M (a,b)
 





where λb replaces λ in the main text.
Proposition 13 M (a,b) is supermodular.
Proof. It follows directly from equation (19), since the cross derivative is
fab(a,b)
r+λa+λb+η > 0 by
assumption 3
B Proof of proposition (7)
As shown in section (4), the assignment function α(.) is a ﬁxed point of the following
functional equation (equation(10) in the main text):




where10 H (x,α(x);α) =
g(x)[ω(x;α)+η]
h(α(x))[̟(α(x);α)+η] and ̟(a;α) = λPr[b / ∈ B(a;α)] and ω (b;α) =
λPr[a / ∈ A(b;α)].
To ﬁnd the solution to this problem, I study the following operator
T (α)(b) := a0 +
  b
b0
  H (x,α(x);α)dx, (21)
where   H (x,α(x);α) =
a1−a0
κ(α) H (x,α(x);α) and κ (α) =
  b1
b0 H (x,α(x);α)dx, and show
that its solutions coincide with those of (20). In what follows, I let M to be the set of
bounded increasing bijective continuous functions mapping [bL,bH] onto [aL,aH].
10For any function F the notation F (x,α(x);α) is used to emphasized that F depends on both the
assignment function evaluated at some point (α(x)) and on the assignment function itself. (α)
24Preliminaries Before studying this problem, I present some lemmas that are going to be
used afterwards.
Lemma 14 T is equicontinuous.
Proof: Consider an arbitrary α ∈ M and an arbitrary b ∈ [bL,bH]. First, note that
  H (b,α(b);α) is bounded above and below. In particular, since:
1. Functions g and h are bounded
pg ≤ g (b) ≤ Pg for all b ∈ [bL,bH],
ph ≤ h(a) ≤ Ph for all a ∈ [aL,aH].
2. And
0 ≤ λPr[a / ∈ A(x;α)] ≤ λ for all b ∈ [bL,bH],
0 ≤ λPr[b / ∈ B(x;α)] ≤ λ for all a ∈ [aL,aH].
3. And η > 0.




















    ∂
∂b (Tα)(b)
    =
        H (b,α(b);α)
     , it has to be the case that
|(Tα)(b) − (Tα)(b
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Then, for every ε > 0, there is a γ = ε
K such that |b − b′| < γ implies |(Tα)(b) − (Tα)(b′)|
< ε. Since this was done for an arbitrary function α ∈ M and b ∈ [bL,bH], it follows that T
is equicontinuous.
Lemma 15 The boundaries of the inaction sets are continuous in α
Proof: I consider the boundaries of the set B(a;α(.)) of acceptable ﬁrms types for an
entrepreneur with ability a. The arguments are the same for the boundaries of the set
A(b;α(.)) of entrepreneurs talent that in equilibrium may be working with a type b ﬁrm.
Given a and α(.), the boundaries of the inaction set B(a;α(.)), b(a;α(.)) and b(a;α(.)),
are the solution to I (a,b;α) = W (a,b) − W (a,γ (a)) = 0. Using equations () and (), this
equation could be written in the following way.
I (a,b;α) = f (a,b) − f (a,γ (a)) −
  b
γ(a)
fb (α(x),x)dx + c = 0,
25where the function γ (a) = α−1 (a), mapping [a0,a1] onto [b0,b1], is well deﬁned, since α is
bijective.
It was already shown that under assumption 3 in the text (supermodularity of the pro-
duction function) for all α ∈ M this equation has two solutions when both I (a,b0;α) < 0
and I (a,b1;α) < 0, one solution when either I (a,b0;α) < 0 and I (a,b1;α) ≥ 0 or viceversa,
and no solution otherwise. The boundaries b(a;α(.)) and b(a;α(.)) are deﬁned as follows
b(a;α(.)) =
 
b0 if I (a,b0;α(.)) ≥ 0
smallest solution of I (a,b;α(.)) = 0 otherwise ,
b(a;α(.)) =
 
b1 if I (a,b1;α(.)) ≥ 0
largest solution of I (a,b;α(.)) = 0 otherwise .
The function I (a,b;α) is continuous in b, and since b takes values in a compact set it is
also uniformly continuous on this set.
Second, given a and b, I (a,b;α(.)) is also continuous in α. That is
 I (a,b;αi) − I (a,b;α)  → 0 , i → ∞,
where  .  is the symbol for the sup-norm.
To see this, consider a sequence {αi} in M converging in the sup norm to α. Note that
I (a,b;αi) − I (a,b;α) = Q1 + Q2 + Q3,
where








[fb (α(x),x) − fb (αi (x),x)]dx,
then,
 I (a,b;αi) − I (a,b;α(.))  ≤  Q1  +  Q4  +  Q3 .
Clearly,  Q1 , Q2  → 0 when i → ∞. It is also the case that  Q3  → 0, since fb (.) is
continuous, so it is uniformly continuous in the relevant set, and because αi converge to α
in the sup norm.
Finally, consider a sequence {αi} in M converging in the sup norm to α, and the cor-
responding sequence {γi} Deﬁne the sequence {bi} as the lower boundary consistent with
αi (.). Let b
∗ be the lower boundary when the assignment function is α(.), and note that
as αi → α (and γi → γ) it should be the case that bi → b∗, since I (a,bi;αi) is uniformly
continuous in all its arguments.
Corollary 16   H (x,α(x);α) is continuous in α.
26Proof: This is the case since α aﬀects   H (x,α(x);α) directly evaluated at α(x) througth
continuos functions, and indirectly througth the eﬀects of α in the boundaries of the inac-
tion set. But from lemma 15 the boundaries are continuous on α, and   H (x,α(x);α) is a
continuous function of the boundaries.
Lemma 17 T is continuos as an operator.
Proof: Consider a sequence {αi} in M converging in the sup norm to α, then
 (Tαi)(b) − (Tα)(b)  ≤ (b − b0)max
          H (x,αi (x);α) −   H (x,α(x);α)
     







         H (x,αi (x);α) −   H (x,α(x);α)
      : x ∈ [b0,b]
 
= 0
.If this where not the case, there would be a γ > 0 and a sequence of {xi} in [b0,b] such that
        H (x,αi (xi);α) −   H (x,α(x);α)
      ≥ γ , i = 1,2,... (22)
But {xi} has a subsequence in [b0,b] that converges. Let denote this subsequence again
by {xi} and denote x∗ = limi→∞ xi. Since  αi − α  → 0
|αi (xi) − α(x
∗)| ≤ |αi (xi) − α(xi)| + |α(xi) − α(x
∗)| → 0,
then αi (xi) → α(x∗), but since both α and   H are continuous limi→∞   H (x∗,αi (xi)) =
  H (x∗,α(x∗)) = limi→∞   H (x∗,α(xi)), contradicting (22).
Proof of proposition 7 (existence) I used the following generalization of the Schauder
ﬁxed point theorem (Ok (2007), p.629, excersice 38)
Theorem 18 (Generalization of Schauder ﬁxed point theorem) Let S be an nonempty
bounded and convex subset of a normed linear space X, and let Φ be a continuous self-map
on S such that clX (Φ(S)) is compact, then Φ has a ﬁxed point.
To apply this theorem, consider the normed linear space Q([bL,bH]) of all bounded
continuous real functions deﬁned on the compact set [bL,bH] with the sup norm and let
M be the set of bounded increasing bijective continuous functions that map [bL,bH] onto
[aL,aH]. Note that M is a nonempty bounded and convex subset of Q([bL,bH]). From
lemma 17 T is a continuous self-map on M. To see that clQ([bL,bH]) (T (M)) is compact, note
that since T (M) is bounded (it is contained in M), the Aezel` a-Ascoli theorem says that all
I need to show is that T (M) is equicontinuous. But this was already shown in lemma 14.
Therefore, the operator T has at least one ﬁxed point.
27Finally, note that α(b1) = a1 and α(b0) = a0, since
α(b1) − α(b0) =
  b1
b0
  H (x,α(x))dx,
it should be the case that
  b1
b0
  H (x,α(x))dx = a1−a0 and therefore α(b) also solves equation
(20)
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